​Bad weather continued to play a huge part on October 24th. For weeks the Isonzo front was under heavy rains and thick clouds. On the 24th, snowstorms occurred on high-elevation This terrible weather played a significant role during the offensive

​At 2:00 AM on October 24th, the German first artillery barrage signaled the beginning of the offensive. This barrage was to neutralize the Italian guns and their first line of trenches. The majority of those munitions were poison gas shells.​

The Italians immediately attempted to retaliate but their powerful searchlights struggled to pinpoint the enemy batteries due to thick fog.

Cloudy weather did not hinder the attackers’ accuracy, as the Germans had set their targets mathematically days ago. 

Many Italian troops were killed without realizing they were poisoned. The fog hid the distinct yellow color.

Around 700 men from the 87th Infantry Regiment (~70 percent of their combatants) were killed immediately north of Flitsch. When the Austrians reached their position, they found no gas masks on the victims.
​​

To the south of the 22nd Division, the Austro-Hungarian 55th Infantry Division would storm Planina za Kraju through the Vršič Pass. 

Saga (Zaga) was strategically important. This was where the Isonzo was narrowed enough for troops to move across. It was connected to Karfreit by a major south-east road through Serpenizza and Trnovavo. ​

​The attack on Mt. Rombom (2208m) failed. A snowstorm on those heights weakened the effect of the gas attack. As the 216th Brigade fought hard to reach the first trenches, they discovered that their artillery barrages failed to damage the barbed wires. They were forced to retreat back to their starting point under intense fire from machine guns ​

Meanwhile, the 59th Mountain Brigade was stopped at the Seebach Valley, unable to assist the assault on Mt. Rombom. 

Mt. Rombom remained in the Italian hands.

To accomplish Sein’s objectives:

• The German Silesian 12th Infantry Division would launch a swift attack in the Isonzo Valley from the Tolmein bridgehead to Karfreit. Once Karfreit was taken, they would continue eastward deeper into the enemy territory. 
• The German Alpenkorps would climb the Kolovrat to storm a strong fortification at Hill 1114. This would take the Italian attention away from the 12th Division below the valley. In addition, controlling Hill 1114 would open a door to Mt. Matajur.
• The Austro-Hungarian 50th Infantry Division would secure the Krn and Mrzili to protect the right flank of the 12th Division.

The 12th Division launched attacks on both banks of the Isonzo.
 
Under the cover of fog and rain, they quickly overwhelmed the defenders who received no artillery support from the heights of Krn and the Kolovrat due to damages to the telephone lines. 

At noon, a forward detachment of 80 men was ambushed by the 4th Bersalieri Brigade of the 62th Division on their way to Idesko near Golobi. But the next German unit arrived with machine guns and pushed the Italians back to Luico (Livek). On the other bank, Kamno was captured at the same time.

The Germans stormed Idersko at 1:00 PM and captured several artillery pieces there. ​

​

​Without pausing, the 12th Division advanced toward Karfreit (Capporetto). The defenders of the 34th Division were panicked by the speed of the advance. Several loud explosions were heard from the town as the Italians were destroying their munition storage.    

By 2:00 PM, the left wing of the 12th Division reached Karfreit and engaged the 34th Division there. At 3:30 AM, the defenders detonated the bridge across the Isonzo while many retreating Italians were visible on the eastern bank. The fight ended when 2000 men of the defenders surrendered at 4:00 PM. As German troops passed through the street of Karfreit, they received a warm welcome from the Slovene civilians. 

The loss of Karfreit made it impossible for the 43rd and 46th Divisions to continue their fight in the night. At 11:30 PM a total of 15,000 men  of the 43rd Infantry Division surrendered to the Germans at Karfreit.

Meanwhile, some elements of the 12th Infantry Division continued their advance deeper into the enemy territory. By midnight, they were in control of Staro Selo and Golobi. 

The 12th Division advanced 23km under intense gunfire and extreme weather on the first day, an extraordinary accomplishment in the Great War.

Yet, the Bavarian Life Guard Regiment's situation was dangerous.

First the news of capturing Hill 1114 did not reach to the Headquarters of the 14th Army until the early hours of the 25th. Coordination with the artillery and nearby friendly troops was impossible as the Life Guard was surrounded by hostile forces. The only nearby allied troops was the 1st Jäger Regiment.

Nevertheless, the 1st Regiment could not reach their position. They were pinned down in the woods in front of Hill #732. All their attempts to get around and attack from multiple directions failed. Their last attempt in the evening with the help of the 200th Infantry Division from Mt. Ježa did not result in a breakthrough. 

These made the Life Guard Regiment very vulnerable to a counterattack. 

The assignments for the 1st Division were difficult. They had to conquer the difficult terrain without sufficient artillery support. There was a shell shortage in the south. Their neighboring Kosak’s Group from the 2nd Isonzo Army did not receive enough shells because the breakthrough at Karfreit was the top priority. 

To circumvent the munition shortage, the men of the 7th and 22nd Mountain Brigades had crossed the no man’s land to the foot of the mountain secretly on the night of October 23rd. They hoped to use the element of surprise to close the distance fast. 

Things went favorably for the 7th Brigade. The cooperation with their neighbor the 3rd Jäger Regiment led to the capture of Cemponi at 11:00 AM and the Jesenjak Ridge at 3:00 PM.

The 7th Mountain Brigade, then, pushed toward the Globočak by themselves. After an effective artillery barrage followed by bloody hand-to-hand combat, they captured Pušno and Srednje at 6:00 PM. They could not advance to the Globočak due to darkness and friendly fire barrage.

The assault on the Hrad Vrh by the 22nd Mountain Brigade was costly. Insufficient artillery preparation failed to destroy Italian batteries hidden in the woods. The foggy weather made it impossible for the attackers to locate and use mortars on them.  

The Italians on the Hrad and Jazne resisted to the bitter end even after the loss of Cemponi by noon. Multiple attempts to take those heights were broken under the intensity of the defender guns. Eventually, the isolated defenders were out of munition, and the 22nd Brigade slowly gained the upper hand.  At 4:00 PM, they finally captured both the Hrad Vrh and Jazne. 

Despite their casualties, the 1st Austrian Division took 4,600 prisoners. 77 field guns, and 32 heavy mortars on the first day. They climbed a total of 900 m and advanced 5 km depth into the enemy mountainous territory. This achievement was considered “a first-class contribution to the operation.”

Withdrawing a million men to the Tagliamento to avoid a potential encirclement was not an option. They could not move the 3-year cumulation of equipment out fast because the road conditions were terrible.  

Cardona devised the three resistance lines for his troops to defend at any cost. This would buy him valuable time to slow the Austro-German momentum. These lines started at Ponta. di Montemaggiore:

• Pta. di Montemaggiore - the Stol - Sarijski - Staro Selo - Mt. Matajur - The Kolovrat Ridge - Jeza - the Globočak
• Pta. di Montemaggiore - Mt. Lupia - Mt. Mia - Mt. Matajur - Mt. S. Martino - Mt. Hum - the Globočak.
• Pta. di Montemaggiore - Mt Carnizza - Mt. Juanes - Mt. Madlessena - Mt Purgessimo - Castel del Monte - Korada. 

​Many of the sectors in the first and second lines either had been taken or contested by the advancing troops. More importantly, the hastily retreating Italians could not defend them while leaving their heavy weaponry behind.

Still, Luigi Cardona expected his men to know how to “win or die.”

Tag: Caporetto, Karfreit, Kobarid, the 12th battle of the Isonzo, Italian Front, 1917

1917 was not a good year for Austria-Hungary in the Italian theater. They had not recovered from the disastrous Brusilov in the previous year. 

The Kingdom of Italy’s strength significantly increased. With more than a million troops, the Italians outnumbered the Austrians 5 to 2. Britain and France supplied their ally with a large number of heavy artillery batteries and munitions. This made the Kingdom a force to be reckoned with.

The Italians launched two ferocious offensives equal to those on the Western Front. They won the Tenth and Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo (12 May – 8 June 1917; 19 August – 12 September 1917), pushing the Austrian Empire to the brink of collapse. ​

​The Austrians’ elastic defense could not work. There was no place left for them to retreat. The sensitive Hermada Citadel was within the Italian reach. If Hermada felt, the strategic port city of Trieste would surely fall. The loss of it would knock the Austria-Hungary Empire out of the war. The Italians would use their number superiority to extend the frontline which the Austrians had no more troops to spare.

On the 22nd of August, Kaiser Karl I of the Austrian Empire personally inspected the troops on the Isonzo Front. In his letter to Kaiser Wilhelm of the German Empire, he asked the German to relieve Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Eastern Front, so they could be deployed to the South-West Front. In addition, he requested to increase supply of heavy guns, ammunition and war materials. Kaiser Karl did not ask for a direct German intervention as both Austria and Italy considered this front was their separate wars. Germany, Britain, and France did not have any division there. 

But the Austrian Chief of Staff Arthur Freiherr Arz von Straußenburg did not believe this was enough to turn the tide. He sent Major General Waldstätten to meet First Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff on August 29th to discuss a joined offensive.

Both Kaiser Wilhelm and Ludendorff were hesitated to release those Austrian divisions. 

In addition to territory losses, the Austrian fighting force was critically low. As for artillery pieces, more than half of the irreplaceable Austrian batteries were captured. The empire could not replenish their losses nor replace their equipment.​

Erich Ludendorff predicted that Austria-Hungary would surrender before 1918. This would leave Germany alone in the war, a consequence that he wanted to avoid at all cost.  

The German General Staff finally agreed ​to a joined counteroffensive.

As Austria had only 21 divisions against 40 Italian divisions, the Central Powers created the German 14th Army from their best troops in the East under the leadership of General der Infanterie Otto von Below.

​It had 17 divisions, 1076 guns, 174 mortars and 31 engineer companies. This Army would be the spearhead of the Fall Offensive.

The main goal of the offensive was to drive the Italians 40 km back to the Tagliamento and beyond. This would shorten the frontline and give favorable terrains for the Austrian defenders.
​
To achieve this, the 14th Army would break through the Italian 2nd Army’s lines at Flitsch (Plezzo) and Tolmein (Tolmin, Tolmino).  Between Flitsch and Tolmien was the the town of Karfreit (Caporetto) which was soon to be a namesake for the Twelve Battle of the Isonzo.
The Offensive would begin in mid-October and end before December. Ludendorff wanted those German divisions back for the Spring Offensive of 1918.

Victories in 1917 came with enormous cost. The staggering loss of more than 300,000 men was more than the two previous years. The kingdom could not send more men fast enough before the winter.

Capello’s reason for this aggressive stance was that he believed the offensive was small in scale. It would be shattered by a general counterattack. 
​
As Cardona did not force his general to follow the 18th September instruction, the Capello HQ intentionally misinterpreted his order. 
As signs of an imminent offensive emerged and Capello’s illness was serious, the weaknesses of the 2nd Army were on display. The Italian leadership attempted to adjust the defense, but it was too late. 

At 2:00 AM on October 24th, a massive artillery barrage fired across the Flitsch-and-Tolmein sector. The Twelve Battle of the Isonzo began.

Those maps were created with Wonderdraft, Inkscape, and GIMP. 

Wonderdraft is a wonderful mapping software that allows users to add symbols and other assets. However, it has shortcomings when the map area is less than 100km square.

To overcome this limit, the mountains have to be drawn painstakingly with the pathing function. One mistake or a change of heart usually takes hours to fix. The risks of corrupting saved files and backup are very high with this technique as the files are large.

For the accuracy and color theme, historical pictures taken in the same month of the Flitsch-Tolmien section the the same period are used. Modern pictures are not reliable because the vegetation from 107 years ago was “less green” compared to nowadays.
 
Inkscape and GIMP are free software that are used to edit the maps created by Wonderdraft. They are also excellent tools to create custom assets.

• OSTERREICH-UNGARNS LETZTER KRIEG, 1914-1918. Vol 6. Pg 532-622

The maps were recreated from the Leaflet024 and Leaflet026. 

• Caporetto and the Isonzo Campaign. The Italian Front 1915-1918. By Željko Cimprić, John Macdonald. ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1848846715
• The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front 1915-1919. By Mark Thompson. ISBN-13: ‎ 978-0465020379 
• Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I. By Alexander Watson. ISBN-13: ‎978-0465094882