The Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo: the First day of Battle October 24th 1917

Note:

• To avoid confusion, Central Powers' troop is in blue and Italian troops is in red.
• Different names of locations are listed at the end of this post.

Weather Condition:

​Bad weather continued to play a huge part on October 24th. For weeks the Isonzo front was under heavy rains and thick clouds. On the 24th, snowstorms occurred on high-elevation This terrible weather played a significant role during the offensive

​The Neutralization of Italian artillery batteries.

​At 2:00 AM on October 24th, the German first artillery barrage signaled the beginning of the offensive. This barrage was to neutralize the Italian guns and their first line of trenches. The majority of those munitions were poison gas shells.​

German Preparing Gas Mortars

The Italians immediately attempted to retaliate but their powerful searchlights struggled to pinpoint the enemy batteries due to thick fog.

Cloudy weather did not hinder the attackers’ accuracy, as the Germans had set their targets mathematically days ago. 

Many Italian troops were killed without realizing they were poisoned. The fog hid the distinct yellow color.

Around 700 men from the 87th Infantry Regiment (~70 percent of their combatants) were killed immediately north of Flitsch. When the Austrians reached their position, they found no gas masks on the victims.
​​

An Austro-Hungarian searchlight. The Italian used several similar search lights on Oct 24th. Imperial War Museum

Fallen Italian victims of the gas attack

WW1 Memorials of the 700 fallen Italian victims of the gas attack.

Even though the Italians used masks, the new chlorine-arsenic argent rendered them useless after two hours of usage. Eventually, the Italians decided to abandon their position and left their guns behind. 

Poison gas shells were not the only reason the Italian’s batteries were ineffective.

The doctrine’s complexity and the rigid centralized command were to blame.

​Because of the constant shortage of ammunition, the March 1917 Artillery Doctrine dictated that the best time to unleash a counterfire was right after the enemy’s destructive barrage. After the destructive barrage ended, an enemy infantry attack would surely follow. Thus the counter barrage at that moment would inflict the maximum damage to the attackers. 

When their positions were under fire, the Italians could not tell if it was a destructive barrage or not due to darkness and foggy weather. The doctrine was also overcomplicated on which specific guns and shells to use. 

Artillery Commanders such as General Guiliano Ricci and Colonel Alfredo Connoniere ordered their batteries to attack immediately. But the Vice Commander of the 2nd Army Pietro Badoglio overruled them. Badoglio explained on the telephone, “We only have munitions for three days and I don’t know if I can let you have any of it. At any rate, we’ll see.”

Thus the intensity of the Italian counter battery decreased. By 4:30 AM, most of the defender’s guns were silenced. 

Pietro Badoglio, Vice Commander of the 2nd Army

At 6:30 AM, 2,000 guns from the Central Powers unleashed a destructive barrage from Mt. Rombom to Görz. Their targets were fortifications, munition depots, headquarters, and especially communication centers. Many of the telephone lines were destroyed.

Badoglio could not give the order for a counter battery when the Austro-German infantry attacked at 7:30 AM. The local artillery officers did not dare open fire without an order from the headquarters. They were also oblivious to the struggling infantry in the forward positions. ​

Effective Range of the main guns. Redrawn and Translated from The Austrian Last War, Vol 4, Leaflet 013.

​Infantry Attack on the First Day

​Krauss’ Group: The austro-hungarian i corps

​Their primary objective was Saga (Žaga). Saga was strategically important. First, the Isonzo near it was narrow enough that troops could move across. To the south-west lay Mt. Stol a vital location for the defenders. To the southeast was a major road to Karfreit through Serpenizza and Trnovavo.

​To reach Saga, the orders of Krauss’s Group were:

The Austro-Hungarian 22nd Schützen Division would make a breakthrough at Flitsch (Bovec, Plezzo) before storming the ruins of Pod Celom. Once Pod Celom was captured, they would advance to Saga. 
​
the Austro-Hungarian 3rd "Edelweiss" Infantry Division would attack Mt. Rombom to protect the right flanks of the 22nd Division. Simultaneously, the 59th Infantry Brigade from the 10th Army would also launch an attack on Mt. Rombom from the north. 

Alfred Krauss. Commander of the Austro-Hungarian I Corps

To the south of the 22nd Division, the Austro-Hungarian 55th Infantry Division would storm Planina za Kraju through the Vršič Pass. 

Saga (Zaga) was strategically important. This was where the Isonzo was narrowed enough for troops to move across. It was connected to Karfreit by a major south-east road through Serpenizza and Trnovavo. ​

Austro-Hungarian I Corps, October 24th 1917.

AUstro-Hungarian 22nd Schützen Division:

A Photo of Flitsch Area taken in October 1917. The direction of attack of the 22nd Schützen Division.

The Advance of the 22nd Schützen Division October 24th.

​At 9:00 AM, the 22nd Division captured the first Italian trenches north of Flitsch. They found no survivors of the gas attack. At the ruins of Flitsch, the Italian defenders from the 50th Infantry Division offered some resistance. Eventually, the Austrians took Flitsch before noon. 

By the evening, the 22nd Division broke through the 3rd line. Pod Celom and Pluzne fell to the Austrian hands.

The 22nd Schützen Division could not reach Saga. Their advance exceeded their artillery bombardment schedule, putting them at risk of friendly fire. As they could not establish communication with their batteries, they halted their assault for the day.

The 22nd Schützen Division took 3000 prisoners, 36 artillery pieces, and 50 machine guns on the first day.

The Town of Flitsch before the Great War.

Captured Italian guns at Flitsch's main square. Kobariški Muzej (Kobarid Museum)

Austro-Hungarian 216th Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division:

​The attack on Mt. Rombom (2208m) failed. A snowstorm on those heights weakened the effect of the gas attack. As the 216th Brigade fought hard to reach the first trenches, they discovered that their artillery barrages failed to damage the barbed wires. They were forced to retreat back to their starting point under intense fire from machine guns ​

An Austro-Hungarian field telephone outpost on Mt Rombon. 1917. Rare Historical Photos

Central Powers troops in snow camouflage cutting through barbed wire lines. Imperial War Museum

Meanwhile, the 59th Mountain Brigade was stopped at the Seebach Valley, unable to assist the assault on Mt. Rombom. 

Mt. Rombom remained in the Italian hands.

Austro-Hungarian 55th Infantry Division:

​The 55th Infantry Division’s assault on Vršič (Moistrocca) (1897m) was equally a struggle. The icy condition not only greatly diminished the effectiveness of the gas barrage but delayed their attack to two hours. This gave the Italian 43rd Division valuable time to strengthen their defense.

At 9:30, as the weather improved, the Austrian attack began after setting off a huge explosion underneath Vršič. While the 55th Division easily captured the first line, they could not reach Vrata, the Dol Plateau, and Planinaza Kraju as planned.

The 43rd Infantry Division fought back fiercely. Not knowing that Karfreit fell at 4:00 PM, they launched a ferocious counterattack that effectively drove the infantry of the 55th Division back to Vršič.

When the news of Karfreit and the retreating order finally reached them around 9:00 PM, it was too late. Confusion, hunger, and exhaustion took over their fighting spirit. Their retreat was disorganized, leaving many guns and heavy equipment behind. Eventually, the 43rd Division and their commander Lieutenant General Farisoglio surrendered to the Germans at Karfreit.

Austrian troops moving through the Vršič Pass. November 1917

​Stein’s Group: the iii royal bavarian army corps

View of the Area from Tolmein Height. Taken October 1917

​Stein’s groups included: the Austro-Hungarian 50th Infantry Division, the German Silesian 12th Division, the German 117th Division, and the Alpenkorps.

Stein’s main objectives were (1) The town of Karfreit and (2) the principal fortification on Mt. Matajur on the Kolovrat. 

Karfreit was important to the Italians on the western side of the Isonzo. There were no major roads to their position at the Vršič Pass, the Krn Plateau, and the Mrzli Vrh Ridge. If Karfreit was captured, the 43rd and 46th Infantry Divisions would be cut off. 

Despite its strategic location, the Italians deployed very few men and guns to defend the Isonzo valley between Karfreit and Tolmein where the two major roads on both banks of the Isonzo were. Instead, their troops were concentrated on the heights of the Kolovrat and the Mrzli Vrh.

​The Italian high command believed any enemy movement to the valley would be an easy target for batteries on the high ground. Yet the defenders’ guns were quiet on October 24th.​

Hermann Freiherr von Stein. Commander of the III Royal Bavarian Army Corps.

To accomplish Sein’s objectives:

• The German Silesian 12th Infantry Division would launch a swift attack in the Isonzo Valley from the Tolmein bridgehead to Karfreit. Once Karfreit was taken, they would continue eastward deeper into the enemy territory. 
• The German Alpenkorps would climb the Kolovrat to storm a strong fortification at Hill 1114. This would take the Italian attention away from the 12th Division below the valley. In addition, controlling Hill 1114 would open a door to Mt. Matajur.
• The Austro-Hungarian 50th Infantry Division would secure the Krn and Mrzili to protect the right flank of the 12th Division.

The Austro-Hungarian 50th Infantry Division:

Austro-Hungarian Storm Troopers (Assault Troops, Stoßtruppen) in 1917

​At 8:00 AM, a mine was detonated under the Krn. Soon, men of the 50th Division took the Krn Plateau, surrounding the enemy at the Krn Summit.  

At 11:00 the 3rd Mountain Brigade captured Krn Village while the 15th Mountain Brigade continued their advance along the Mrzli Vrn ridge and captured Gabrije
.
Without support from their heavy batteries, the Italian 46th Infantry Division resisted strongly as it retreated to the 2nd positions Kozljak - Pleca - Vrsno - Selisce. 

In the afternoon the 15th Mountain Brigade joined the right column of the 12th Infantry Division. Together, they overwhelmed the defenders at Ladra in the evening, effectively cutting off the 46th and 43rd Division from retreating east of the Isonzo.

The 50th Infantry Division took 7000 prisoners and 90 guns on the first day.

Troops of the 3rd Mountain Brigade scale the slopes of Krn. 1917. Rare Historical Photos

Austro-Hungarian troops examining captured heavy Italian artillery guns. Imperial War Museum.

The 12th German Silesian Infantry Division 

View from the Tolmein Basin toward Karfreit. The direction of the attack of the 12th Silesian Division. Kobariški Muzej (Kobarid Museum)

The 12th Division launched attacks on both banks of the Isonzo.
 
Under the cover of fog and rain, they quickly overwhelmed the defenders who received no artillery support from the heights of Krn and the Kolovrat due to damages to the telephone lines. 

At noon, a forward detachment of 80 men was ambushed by the 4th Bersalieri Brigade of the 62th Division on their way to Idesko near Golobi. But the next German unit arrived with machine guns and pushed the Italians back to Luico (Livek). On the other bank, Kamno was captured at the same time.

The Germans stormed Idersko at 1:00 PM and captured several artillery pieces there. ​

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​Without pausing, the 12th Division advanced toward Karfreit (Capporetto). The defenders of the 34th Division were panicked by the speed of the advance. Several loud explosions were heard from the town as the Italians were destroying their munition storage.    

By 2:00 PM, the left wing of the 12th Division reached Karfreit and engaged the 34th Division there. At 3:30 AM, the defenders detonated the bridge across the Isonzo while many retreating Italians were visible on the eastern bank. The fight ended when 2000 men of the defenders surrendered at 4:00 PM. As German troops passed through the street of Karfreit, they received a warm welcome from the Slovene civilians. 

The loss of Karfreit made it impossible for the 43rd and 46th Divisions to continue their fight in the night. At 11:30 PM a total of 15,000 men  of the 43rd Infantry Division surrendered to the Germans at Karfreit.

Meanwhile, some elements of the 12th Infantry Division continued their advance deeper into the enemy territory. By midnight, they were in control of Staro Selo and Golobi. 

The 12th Division advanced 23km under intense gunfire and extreme weather on the first day, an extraordinary accomplishment in the Great War.

Column of Italian prisoners guarded by German soldiers. Imperial War Museum.

The Alpenkorps: 

​The Alpenkorps started their offensive from Sv. Maria at the same time as the 12th Silesian Division. 

Their main objective was the fortress on Hill 1114 (Height #1114). On the right, the Bavarian Life Guard Regiment would capture Foni and attack the hill from the North. On the left wing, the 1st Bavarian Jäger Regiment would storm the trenches of Hill 732 and the church at Slemen. From Slemen, they would attack Hill 1114 from the South-East. 

At 9:00 AM, the Alpenkorps captured the first defensive line S.Daniel- Woltschach -Ciginj. 

German troops moving through the church of St. Daniel near Woltschach. Kobariški Muzej

The destroyed Italian first trenches at Woltschach. Kobariški Muzej

However, the climb to the Kolovrat Ridge was challenging. Each man had to carry at least 45kg of equipment further weighted down by the pouring rain. The enemy outnumbered them, so they had to move carefully from cover to cover to bypass strong points. 

At noon, the Life Guard Regiment, “frozen and soaked to the bone”, reached the Kovačič Plateau and captured Foni.

Without resting, they attacked Hill 1114 from the North. The defenders were surprised, but they still put up a strong resistance. After a heavy bombardment from the German batteries, the Life Guard finally captured the fortification at 5:30 PM. 

Italian trenches at Hill 1114. Kobariški Muzej.

Yet, the Bavarian Life Guard Regiment's situation was dangerous.

First the news of capturing Hill 1114 did not reach to the Headquarters of the 14th Army until the early hours of the 25th. Coordination with the artillery and nearby friendly troops was impossible as the Life Guard was surrounded by hostile forces. The only nearby allied troops was the 1st Jäger Regiment.

Nevertheless, the 1st Regiment could not reach their position. They were pinned down in the woods in front of Hill #732. All their attempts to get around and attack from multiple directions failed. Their last attempt in the evening with the help of the 200th Infantry Division from Mt. Ježa did not result in a breakthrough. 

These made the Life Guard Regiment very vulnerable to a counterattack. 

​Berrer’s Group: german LI corps

The prized objective was the fortification at the Ježa Height. This assignment was as challenging as their Alpenkorps’s. To achieve this:
​

• The 4th Jäger Regiment from the German 200th Infantry Division would climb to the Jesenjak Ridge to assault Hill #428 after conquering Ciginj. 

 

• The 3rd Jäger Regiment would make a breakthrough at Cemponi before moving north to regroup with the 4th Regiment.

​

• The 3rd and 4th Regiments, then, would assault on Ježa.

Albert von Berrer. Commander of the German LI Corps. Killed in Action on October 28th 1917.

​Things did not go well for the 4th Jäger Regiment. They captured the first line at Ciginj so easily. Most Italian troops had withdrawn from the first trenches to Jesenjak the previous day. 

As they were climbing, they were facing much larger forces than expected who were on favorable grounds. They were pinned down by intense shelling barrages and machine gun fires in front of Hill 428 for several hours to the late evening. 

The situation of the 3rd Jäger Regiment on the left was better. While the defenders put up more fight than expected, the cooperation with the Austrian 7th Mountain Brigade from Scotti’s Group proved fruitful. After hours of fighting, a breakthrough at Cemponi happened before noon.

Without resting, they attacked the Jesenjak Ridge from the south. At 2:00 PM, the chapel at Hill 631 was captured after repeling a fierce counterattack from the elite Alpini of the 19th Infantry Division.

Soon the 3rd Jäger Regiment and the 7th Mountain Brigade secured the ridge and the outlying hills near Jera, allowing the pinned 4th Jäger Regiment to break through Hill 428 at 3:00 PM.

As the Austrian Brigade moved toward Bizaki, the 3rd and 4th Jäger Regiments began the assault on Ježa. This position was well fortified and the defender fought back fiercely. The German regiments exhausted all their available options. Ježa was captured in the evening only after a brutal hand-to-hand combat. 

Some elements of the 3rd and 4th Regiments went north to assist the 1st Bavarian Regiment but failed to change the situation on Height 732.

They were reinforced by the 5th Jäger Regiment at night. 

At the end of the day, Berrer’s Group took thousands of Italian prisoners and captured 99 artillery pieces, 45 trench mortars, and 75 machine guns.

An illustration of hand-to-hand combat on the Italian Front. La Domenica del Corriee July 1916.

Scotti’s Group: austro-hungarian XV corps

​The main goal of Scotti’s group was to help the 2nd Isonzo Army cross the Isonzo in the south. To do that they need to secure the heights of Jazne, Globočak, and Kostanjevica.

The assignments for the 1st Austro-Hungary Infantry Division were:

• The 7th Mountain Brigade would join the 3rd Jäger Regiment in the assault on Cemponi and Jesenjak Ridge. Next, they would advance toward the Globočak with the 22nd Mountain Brigade along the ridge line. 


• The 22nd Mountain Brigade would storm the Hrad Vrh before attacking the Jazne trenches. 


• The 5th German Infantry Division would provide support to the operation. ​

Karl Scotti. Commander of Austro-Hungarian XV Corps.

The assignments for the 1st Division were difficult. They had to conquer the difficult terrain without sufficient artillery support. There was a shell shortage in the south. Their neighboring Kosak’s Group from the 2nd Isonzo Army did not receive enough shells because the breakthrough at Karfreit was the top priority. 

To circumvent the munition shortage, the men of the 7th and 22nd Mountain Brigades had crossed the no man’s land to the foot of the mountain secretly on the night of October 23rd. They hoped to use the element of surprise to close the distance fast. 

Things went favorably for the 7th Brigade. The cooperation with their neighbor the 3rd Jäger Regiment led to the capture of Cemponi at 11:00 AM and the Jesenjak Ridge at 3:00 PM.

The 7th Mountain Brigade, then, pushed toward the Globočak by themselves. After an effective artillery barrage followed by bloody hand-to-hand combat, they captured Pušno and Srednje at 6:00 PM. They could not advance to the Globočak due to darkness and friendly fire barrage.

The assault on the Hrad Vrh by the 22nd Mountain Brigade was costly. Insufficient artillery preparation failed to destroy Italian batteries hidden in the woods. The foggy weather made it impossible for the attackers to locate and use mortars on them.  

The Italians on the Hrad and Jazne resisted to the bitter end even after the loss of Cemponi by noon. Multiple attempts to take those heights were broken under the intensity of the defender guns. Eventually, the isolated defenders were out of munition, and the 22nd Brigade slowly gained the upper hand.  At 4:00 PM, they finally captured both the Hrad Vrh and Jazne. 

Despite their casualties, the 1st Austrian Division took 4,600 prisoners. 77 field guns, and 32 heavy mortars on the first day. They climbed a total of 900 m and advanced 5 km depth into the enemy mountainous territory. This achievement was considered “a first-class contribution to the operation.”

The 2nd Isonzo Army: Kosak's Group

The main objective of Kosak’s group was the Vrh Heights located in the northern part of the Bainsizza-Heiligengeist Plateau.

The imposing Vrh would offer a safe river crossing passage between Auzza and Ronzina. In addition, possessing Vrh would prevent Italian XXIV Korps’ interference with the 14th Army’s operation.

To reach Vrh, the Austro-Hungarian 60th, 35th, and 24th Infantry Divisions had to overcome the trenches east of Torrent Avšček,

Ferdinand Kosak. Commander of the Kosak's Group.

​This was a very difficult assignment for Kosak’s group. Not only the enemy's presence was substantially larger, but their artillerymen did not receive enough shells for the offensive. 

Their casualties were the highest on the first day.

​At 8:00 AM, the Austrian 60th Division stormed the trenches in the Isonzo Valley and took 450 prisoners.

The Italian 65th Infantry Division launched a counterattack supported by numerous powerful batteries to retake their position. The 60th Division sustained heavy casualties. They were forced to withdraw back to the starting position before noon. 

In the afternoon, they were reinforced with the 69th Infantry Brigade from the 35th Division. They launched another assault on the trenches in the Mešjak area.

Their attack was not well supported by their batteries due to the shortage. The enemy position was intact, and they unleashed their superior firepower on the attackers. The Austrian casualties were too enormous to continue the assault. The 60th Division was driven back to the starting line. 

The attack on Hoje -Sveti Tomaž section was equally costly.

Artillery preparatory barrage failed to damage enemy positions. Even though the infantry of the 35th and 24th Divisions captured those trenches and the church at Sveti Tomaž, their combat strength was too low to hold them.

​After repelling multiple counterattacks during the day, the 35th Division had to retire to their starting position in the evening. The 24th Division barely defended their gain at Sveti Tomaž.

Austro-Hungarian soldiers on the Isonzo Front in 1917.

A church ruined by Austro-Hungarian shell fire on the Italain Front. Imperial War Museum

​Result and Reactions at the end of the first day

The Central Powers

The first day was a huge success for the Central Power.

The HQ of the 14th Army was aware of the impressive breakthroughs at Flitsch and Karfreit. Italian troops were trapped at the Vršič, the Krn, and the Mrzli and the number of prisoners were exceeding their expectations. 

Reports of important victories at Hill 1114, and Ježa did not reach the HQ by 11:00 PM. General of the Infantry Below saw no reason to alter his plan for the second day of the offensive.

The high casualties and the shortage of artillery munitions forced the commander of the 2nd Isonzo Army to alter his plan. General of the Infantry Henriquez decided not to renew the attack on the Avšček trenches. Instead, he instructed Field Marshal Lieutenant Kosak to deploy his reserves to help Scotti’s Group advance toward the Globočak and Kostanjevica on October 25th. 

Otto von Below, Commander of the Austro-German 14th Army.

The Italian Reactions:

The Italian officials did not expect a major offensive in Karfreit. Chief of Staff Luigi Cardona firmly believed his well-prepared troops and their batteries would break any small-scale offensive.  

When the reports of the Central Powers’ artillery barrage from Mt. Rombom to Görz reached Rome at 8:00 AM, Cardona was dismissive.

As a few telephone lines were still working, information slowly reached the Supreme Command at Udine and the government at Rome. 

At noon, the Minister of War Giardino affirmed that there would be no enemy major offensive until the spring of 1918 in the Italian parliament. Shortly after his speech, he received an urgent report from Udine. The enemy had launched a major offensive from Tolmein.

Confusion soon took over as every new piece of information was worse than the previous. 
​
In the middle of the confusion, Cardona was relaxed. At 6:00 PM, according to Colonel Angelo Gatti, Cardona claimed that the enemy had concentrated his forces on the front where the Italians were strong and well-prepared. Cardona believed that the Italian batteries were roaring thunderously upon the attackers. 

Before 10:00 PM. The scale of the catastrophe shook his confidence off completely. He discovered that the 2nd Army Headquarters was paralyzed for the entire day. Capello, the commander himself, was bedridden. His second-in-command Lieutenant General Badoglio could not grasp the situation after the communication centers were destroyed. The heavy batteries in the back failed to provide the fire support the defending infantry desperately needed. Reserved troops were sent to battles that had been lost. Divisional commanders were afraid of taking the initiative. The Corps leadership traded blame on each other. In some cases, subordinates refused to follow orders from abusive leaders. 

Meanwhile, the German 14th Army advanced at an unprecedented speed, taking as many as 20,000 prisoners.

Luigi Cadorna. Chief of Staff of the Royal Italian Army

Gaetano Giardino. Minister of War

Withdrawing a million men to the Tagliamento to avoid a potential encirclement was not an option. They could not move the 3-year cumulation of equipment out fast because the road conditions were terrible.  

Cardona devised the three resistance lines for his troops to defend at any cost. This would buy him valuable time to slow the Austro-German momentum. These lines started at Ponta. di Montemaggiore:

• Pta. di Montemaggiore - the Stol - Sarijski - Staro Selo - Mt. Matajur - The Kolovrat Ridge - Jeza - the Globočak
• Pta. di Montemaggiore - Mt. Lupia - Mt. Mia - Mt. Matajur - Mt. S. Martino - Mt. Hum - the Globočak.
• Pta. di Montemaggiore - Mt Carnizza - Mt. Juanes - Mt. Madlessena - Mt Purgessimo - Castel del Monte - Korada. 

​Many of the sectors in the first and second lines either had been taken or contested by the advancing troops. More importantly, the hastily retreating Italians could not defend them while leaving their heavy weaponry behind.

Still, Luigi Cardona expected his men to know how to “win or die.”

Note on locations that have different names.

• Karfreit: Capporetto, Kobarid
• The Isonzo (River): ​Soča 
• Flitsch: Bovec, Plezzo
• Saga: Žaga
• Stol: Hochstuhl​
• Vršič: Moistrocca
• Krn: Monte Nero
• Luico: Livek
• Woltschach: Volče​​

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Main Sources

• OSTERREICH-UNGARNS LETZTER KRIEG, 1914-1918. Vol 6. Pg 532-622

The maps were recreated from the Leaflet024 and Leaflet026. 

• Caporetto and the Isonzo Campaign. The Italian Front 1915-1918. By Željko Cimprić, John Macdonald. ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1848846715
• The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front 1915-1919. By Mark Thompson. ISBN-13: ‎ 978-0465020379 
• Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I. By Alexander Watson. ISBN-13: ‎978-0465094882
• The Imperial War Museum 
• The Kobarid Museum 

The Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo: Situation on October 23rd, 1917